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Summary
As one of the most important cornerstones of modern economy, insurance industry is subject to
rigorous supervision worldwide. Overall objectives of the supervision include protection of
policyholders, maintenance of market order and systemic stability of the industry. In order to realize
these objectives, supervisory authorities in most countries implement not only strict market entry
standards, but also attach great importance to procedures of insurance market exit.
“Insurance market exit” in this thesis refers to the extinction of an insurance company as a
legal entity in a market. In the case of insurance market exit, sophisticated rules & procedures other
than general bankruptcy law must be implemented to realize orderly withdrawal from the market
without putting the whole financial system in jeopardy. These rules & procedures constitute “market
exit mechanism”, which reflects the degree of maturity of an economy. A sound market exit
mechanism provides overall guidelines and due procedures in case of insurance business failure,
exerts great pressure on insurance companies to improve profitability and helps realize more
efficient allocation of insurance market resources.
The objective of this thesis is to present legislative suggestions on the improvement of Chinese
insurance market exit mechanism in light of Japanese experiences. The significance of the research
lies in the indispensable nature of market exit mechanism in a market economy. Against the
background of accelerating financial liberalization in China, market exit will no longer exists only
on paper, but also has become possible for some insurance companies in China.
In the Japanese model of insurance market exit mechanism, as illustrated in the cases of
Nissan Life and Chiyoda Life, a series of laws and relevant administrative regulations provide clear
guidelines on market exit. Scientific market exit criteria including solvency margin are clarified.
Concrete administrative & judicial procedures are administered. A sound safety net with protection
fund as the solid basis has also been established. The Japanese model have successfully avoided
systemic failure and defused public panic. Although insurance market exit mechanism in China has
had a preliminary framework, the abstract nature of the framework and the lack of adequate
legislation on concrete procedures & effective standards make the framework difficult to apply. The
existing insurance market exit could not cope with the complex situation after further market reform
and financial liberalization. China should borrow the experiences of Japan to establish a fair, open &
just insurance market exit mechanism.
In light of Japanese experiences, conclusions of the thesis are summarized as suggestions to
relevant Chinese authorities. These suggestions fall into four aspects, including the form of further
market exit legislation, criteria of market exit, the procedure of market exit and the safety net in
market exit: (1) the cabinet should promulgate two related regulations based on the existing laws,
with respective focus on the administrative procedure by which the regulator disposes of a problem
company before the file of bankruptcy to the court and the judicial procedure by which the court
hears the bankruptcy case; (2) The criteria of insurance market exit should be a composite index
system based on solvency margin, and also include crucial factors of internal control, management
capability and quality of business &assets, etc.; (3) Market exit procedure adopted by relevant
authorities should have legal basis outlined clearly in relevant laws & regulations and allows
maximum disclosure of information on decision-making process and remedies against encroachment
upon the legitimate rights of stakeholders; (4) The safety net should be improved in two aspects, i.e.,
the optimization of the fundraising model of the insurance security fund to handle crisis of great
magnitude, and the maximization of social interests as well as policyholders’ rights to realize market
& social stability.
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1CHAPTER 1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE
“Market exit” refers to the extinction of an enterprise as a legal entity in a market. While market
entry is the starting point of an enterprise, market exit means the end of the life cycle for the
enterprise in the market. In a market economy, due to various risks associated with corporate
operations and outside business environment, any enterprise could face the possibility of market exit.
Therefore, it is natural for a market economy to put a legal framework for market exit in place, in
order to facilitate the proceedings, protect relevant market participants and maintain the stability of
the macro-economy. Moreover, in the case of financial institutions (so-called artillery of economy),
more sophisticated rules & procedures other than general bankruptcy law must be followed to realize
orderly withdrawal from the market without putting the whole financial system in jeopardy. These
rules & procedures constitute “market exit mechanism”, which reflects the degree of maturity of an
economy.
Following the “Reform and Opening-up” policy, China has taken comprehensive economic
reforms to transform a planned economy into a vibrant modern market economy over decades.
Nevertheless, a fully mature market economy could not be accomplished at a short notice. Actually,
China still has many loopholes in its economic infrastructure. In recent days, calls for the leadership
to take decisive actions to promote free market economy further have reached a new pitch. One of
the decisions that China has to make right now concerns the enactment of some essential rules in its
financial regulatory framework. This thesis is an effort to address one of the most important financial
regulatory rules in China, i.e., market exit mechanism in the insurance industry.
SECTION 1.1 OBJECTIVE & SIGNIFICANCE
The objective of the research is to present legislative suggestions on the improvement of
insurance market exit mechanism to the Chinese insurance regulatory authorities and relevant
legislators. These suggestions are supposed to fall into four specific aspects, concerning the form of
2market exit legislation, criteria of market exit, the procedure of market exit and the safety net in
market exit. All four aspects are inalienable parts of a comprehensive market exit mechanism.
The significance of the research lies in the indispensable nature of market exit mechanism in a
market economy. Against the background of accelerating financial liberalization in China, market
exit will no longer exists only on paper, but also has become possible for some insurance companies.
Therefore, the research carries both theoretical and practical significance.
A sound market exit mechanism in Chinese insurance industry is expected to function in several
important ways: (1) the mechanism will provide guidelines and due procedures in case of insurance
business failure. Under the guidance of the mechanism, the insurance regulator could monitor risks
of insolvency, admonish the possibility of failure, and perform the due procedure of closure. The
legitimate rights of policyholders are also supposed to be protected by the mechanism. As a result,
market exit mechanism will cushion the huge impact of an insurance company’s market exit to the
whole economy as well as the society; (2) the mechanism will exert great pressure on insurance
companies to improve profitability and refrain from illegal market behaviors. On the one hand, the
establishment of the market exit mechanism will undoubtedly send insurance companies a strong
signal that the government will not shy away from shutting down a failed company. On the other
hand, illegal behaviors will bring serious consequences including the closure of the company. As a
result, more prudence in daily management and vigilance against risks can be expected from the
management; (3) the mechanism will help realize more efficient allocation of market resources. A
failing company usually shows low productivity and bad utilization of resources. Timely and orderly
shutdown of a badly managed company will transfer quality assets, product portfolios and human
resources to a more efficient company.
SECTION 1.2 METHODOLOGY
Methodology employed in this research includes literature survey, comparison and
exemplification through cases. First of all, extensive collection of relevant reading materials has
3been made. These reading materials include not only researches by Chinese scholars but also
Japanese counterparts. International organizations and the Japanese government have also published
many valuable reference materials. These data collection activities have provided a solid foundation
for the present research. Secondly, Japanese insurance industry & supervision in general and the
evolvement of market exit mechanism in particular will be discussed. A comparison between the
insurance supervision and market exit mechanism in Japan and those in China will be made. Finally,
a blueprint of insurance market exit regulation for China, in light of Japanese experiences, will be
drawn. The third main method is exemplification through case study on Japanese insurance market
exit cases. Through study on the bankruptcy of two insurance companies, Nissan Life and Chiyoda
Life, the real application of this mechanism in Japan will also be examined. The case study of
Japanese examples will show strategic choices concerning the design of exit mechanism in China.
Moreover, since the thesis aims at making legislative suggestions to relevant policy makers and
legislators, a legal perspective is essential for the thesis to be relevant. Meanwhile, insurance market
is closely related with the real economy, so that macro-economic situation and national condition
must also be taken into consideration. In this sense, an economic perspective is also important.
SECTION 1.3 STRUCTURE
The thesis includes 5 chapters. Chapter 1 explains the background and significance,
methodology, structure, brief summary of conclusions as well as originality & shortcomings of the
study. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the whole research. Chapter 2 explains the concept of
market exit & market exit mechanism, emphasizes the necessity of market exit legislation, and
reviews literature on the subject by scholars home and abroad. Chapter 2 establishes a theoretical
framework for the following chapters. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the examination of the Japanese
insurance regulation and focuses on the insurance market exit mechanism through two bankruptcy
cases. Chapter 4 provides a panoramic overview of Chinese insurance industry, regulation as well as
the existing market exit mechanism. Given the problems in the market exit mechanism in China,
4Chapter 5 will draw conclusions from the above study as policy suggestions to the authorities.
SECTION 1.4 EXPECTED CONCLUSIONS
Since the objective of the research is to present legislative suggestions on the improvement
of insurance market exit mechanism to the Chinese insurance regulatory authorities and relevant
legislators, conclusions in the form of suggestions will fall into four aspects, namely, the form of
market exit legislation, criteria of market exit, the procedure of market exit and the safety net to
realize orderly market exit: (1) the legislation should include at least two different but related
administrative regulations based on the Insurance Law, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and other
relevant laws. The first regulation should focus on the administrative procedure by which the
insurance regulator disposes of a problem insurance company before the file of bankruptcy case to
the court. The second regulation should establish a concrete judicial procedure by which the court
hears the bankruptcy case of an insurance company, and the coordination principles between the
insurance regulator and the court; (2) criteria of insurance market exit should be based on the
solvency margin, and also include other factors such as internal control, management competence
and quality of business & assets, etc. For an insurance company, bankruptcy based on general index
of liquidity or solvency would not work or in the best interests of the society. A more comprehensive
index system is needed to fully understand the condition of an insurance company and make sound
judgment on the sustainability of the company; (3) the procedure to realize market exit should be a
judicial procedure with the court at the center of the bankruptcy proceedings. From the viewpoints of
transparency, credibility and impartiality, the court should be empowered with the ultimate deciding
power throughout the proceedings. Although the participation of the insurance regulator should not
be excluded in the judicial procedure, the role of the government should be confined to consultation
& cooperation; (4) the safety net should take the protection of policyholders’ interests and the
maintenance of market stability as the most important objectives. In order to discharge its
responsibility, the security fund should be strengthened. Meanwhile, the legitimate rights of other
5stakeholders as well as societal interests should all also be taken into consideration to maximize the
interests of the whole society.
SECTION 1.5 ORIGINALITY & SHORTCOMINGS
The originality of the thesis stems from the systematic & critical study of Japanese insurance
market exit mechanism based on the history as well as the latest development. While most other
literature simply describes the Japanese model as if the model is static, in this thesis Japanese
insurance market and supervision in general and the gradual evolvement of market exit mechanism
in particular will all be put under close scrutiny. At the same time, this thesis spares no effort to
explain the particular national conditions behind the evolvement of the exit mechanism, so that the
nature of particularity & universality of the Japanese model can be readily understood. Learning
without simply copying could be made thereafter on the improvement of Chinese insurance market
exit mechanism.
Although the author has worked in China’s insurance regulatory body, the study on market exit
mechanism actually goes beyond daily concerns. As a result, some observations may lack depth in
terms of practice. In addition, as the study is mainly concerned with Japanese insurance industry and
regulation, the author’s Japanese language proficiency makes the full understanding of original
materials somewhat difficult, ending up with dependency on Chinese researchers’ studies.
6CHAPTER 2. INSURANCE MARKET EXIT MECHANISM
This chapter establishes a basic theoretical framework for the whole thesis. Section 2.1 explains
in detail the concept & content of market exit mechanism. Insurance market exit mechanism in the
research is defined as the aggregation of legal guidelines & procedures concerning insurance market
exit. The mechanism finds its way in a series of laws, regulations and practices in handling failing
insurance companies by relevant authorities. As the next step, Section 2.2 introduces the consensus
on the necessity to make further legislation on market exit mechanism in China. The shared concern
about the inadequacy of market exit mechanism in China underlines the importance of the research
and the urgency of the legislative task. In Section 2.3, literature on the subject of market exit
mechanism, including studies on the Japanese mechanism, will be examined. These studies provide
invaluable data and insightful observations, so that this research could build on a solid foundation.
SECTION 2.1 DEFINITION
Market exit in the insurance industry carries both general meaning and specific meaning.
Broadly speaking, any participants in the market including insurance organizations and insurance
practitioners can exit from the insurance market. In the case of insurance organizations, there are
insurance companies, reinsurance companies and insurance intermediary companies. Meanwhile,
insurance practitioners include shareholders, managerial personnel, staff and common salespeople.
However, when insurance market exit is referred to in general conditions, it usually means the exit of
an insurance company, by far the most influential player in the market.
Researchers have defined insurance market exit from different angles with different emphasis.
In this research, insurance market exit means the dissolution of a legal entity, an end to its operation,
and liquidation and transfer of its assets & debts to a carryover company. In some cases, insurance
market exit may also include a partial market exit, referring to an exit from certain geographic area
of the market or a suspension to certain business lines, but market exit in this sense is not within the
7attention of the present research. Insurance market exit carries significant repercussions to the whole
insurance market and numerous policyholders. As an integral part of the financial market, insurance
market is highly regulated, from market entry to its daily operations and final exit. Even in case of
voluntary market exit, prior approval by the regulator is required. Furthermore, laws & regulations
also demand compulsory market exit when certain criteria are met, in order to avoid growing
consequences as a result of delayed handling of insolvent companies.
Insurance market exit mechanism refers to the aggregation of guidelines and procedures
concerning insurance market exit, usually in the form of formal legislation. As a matter of fact, most
countries stipulate rules concerning market exit in more than one law. In China, the Insurance Law
and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law have laid down basic rules on market exit in the insurance
market. Moreover, the State Council (China’s cabinet) and the China Insurance Regulatory
Commission (CIRC) have also made a series of administrative regulations according to these laws.
However, the establishment of more concrete procedures and specific rules is needed to realize
those general legal principles and make the insurance market exit mechanism complete and practical.
According to International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) in the brochure titled
Insurance Core Principles, Standards, Guidance and Assessment Methodology, general principles
for designing market exit mechanism are described in ICP 12 “Winding-up and Exit from the
Market”:
“The legislation defines a range of options for the exit of insurance legal entities from the
market. It defines insolvency and establishes the criteria and procedure for dealing with insolvency
of insurance legal entities. In the event of winding-up proceedings of insurance legal entities, the
legal framework gives priority to the protection of policyholders and aims at minimizing disruption
to the timely provision of benefits to policyholders1.”
Therefore, market exit mechanism should comply with several general principles, i.e., 1) it
should be in the form of a formal legislation; 2) insolvency and measures for dealing with it must be
8stipulated clearly; 3) it must give priority to the protection of policyholders; 4) the disruption to the
market should be minimized.
SECTION 2.2 NESSICITY OF LEGISLATION
Market exit mechanism reflects the degree of maturity of an economy. In a planned or
controlled economy, the government is the implicit last guarantee for bankrupt companies. The lack
of the possibility of market exit means serious moral hazard from the management and heavy burden
for the government & taxpayers. The imbalance between rights & responsibilities betrays the basic
market principle that a company is free to take action as regard to its operations and responsible for
its risks at the same time. An economy without market exit mechanism is not a market economy in
the real sense of the term. Actually, on the urgency to establish a comprehensive insurance market
exit mechanism, a consensus between international organizations and the Chinese authorities has
already reached.
In 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a financial sector stability assessment
report on China. The IMF report pointed out the need for regulation concerning the exit of insurance
companies from market:
“The CIRC has a comprehensive supervisory framework in place but the solvency regimes need to
be strengthened. The minimum solvency margin should be risk-based. The continued issuance of new
business by companies operating below the 100 percent solvency level is undesirable. Explicit and
clear regulation is needed for facilitating the exit of insurance companies from the market via policy
liability run off or portfolio transfers. Off-site monitoring could be strengthened through
reinstatement of the early warning ratios previously required in insurer returns2.”
Actually, the concern of IMF is by no means alone. The Chinese authorities have long noticed
the problem of lacking “explicit and clear regulation” of market exit mechanism for financial
9institutions in general. In November 2013, the topic was written on the agenda for a comprehensive
economic and social reform in the Third Plenum of the 18th China Communist Party Central
Committee. In the agenda, Article 12 of the third chapter titled “Quicken the Perfection of Modern
Market System”, the Party asked relevant authorities to “…perfect the market-wise exit mechanism
for financial institutions3”. The inclusion of this article means that market exit mechanism for
financial institutions will be a priority for the Chinese financial supervisory community in the
coming years.
As the main supervisor, the CIRC shoulders the responsibility of research and draft of insurance
market exit regulation. The Twelfth Five-year Development Outline (2011-2015) for the Insurance
Industry promulgated by the CIRC singles out the establishment of market exit mechanism as an
important task. Article 15 of the Outline reads that the CIRC will:
“Define the necessary conditions and standards for market exit scientifically and carry out
market exit in an orderly manner. Through the implementation of market exit mechanism, the market
will realize the selection of good performers and the washout of market losers, the optimization and
reconfiguration of market resources, and enhanced efficiency of resources allocation4. ”
To sum up, a consensus exists on the urgency and importance of a comprehensive insurance
market exit mechanism. Due to less than four decades of development, the insurance industry in
China has yet experienced a complete economic cycle. Up to now, there is no record of bankruptcy
of any insurance company in China. Furthermore, the closed nature of Chinese insurance industry
has made it relatively immune from outside shock even as far-reaching as the financial crisis in 2008.
The legislation has little to learn from past experiences. As a result, learning from advanced
countries with a mature insurance market and a seasoned market exit mechanism regime such as
Japan becomes inevitable.
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SECTION 2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW
Numerous studies have already been done on market exit mechanism in the Chinese insurance
industry. These studies have laid a solid foundation for the research and final enactment of relevant
supervisory rules. Generally speaking, these studies could be classified into the following four
categories, including studies on the definition, necessity, problem, and legislative advice on the
mechanism.
Firstly, many scholars have pointed out the importance of a well-defined concept of market exit
in the insurance industry. Bo Yanna (2013) pointed out that three layers of definition concerning
market exit exist. Market exit includes the exit of all market participants including shareholders,
managerial staff, legal entities and subsidiaries in the most general sense. In a more strict sense,
market exit refers to the extinction of a legal entity in the insurance market through disintegration,
de-licensing or bankruptcy. In the strictest sense of the concept, market exit means the exit of a
market entity through market selection without administrative or judicial interference5. Shen
Nanning (2008) defined market exit not only in terms of insurers but also includes other market
participants including policyholders6. Chen Ming (2007) classified market exit by financial
institutions according to the willingness of a particular institution, i.e., whether the institution exits
the market based on its free will or is ordered to exit by relevant authorities7.
Secondly, many articles have articulated the importance and urgency to establish a fully-fledged
market exit mechanism in the insurance market. Liang Tao (2013), from the viewpoint of a regulator,
described the perfection of market exit mechanism as a significant step to construct a modern
supervisory system, an important component of international financial regulation reform and a
necessity for the healthy development of the Chinese insurance market8. Wang Debao (2010) called
for a market exit mechanism after citing extensive data proving that illegal activities were becoming
rampant due to the lack of market exit pressure to insurers9. Huang Jiongxiang et al., (2010)
explained the necessity as a natural demand of the insurance sector for its further and sustainable
development, and also pointed out that the government should not salvage failing insurance
companies in the future to avoid moral hazard10.
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Thirdly, the problems of the exiting market exit mechanism are also exposed by these studies.
Among them, Chen Hua & Zhang Yan (2010) pointed out the lack of comprehensive and workable
legislation, a risk warning & management regime and a sound safety net11. Their opinions were
echoed in numerous other articles, including Sun Peicheng et al. (2011)12, Tuo guozhu & Wang
Debao (2010)13, and Guo Chen (2008)14. Finally, based on their studies, these scholars also came
up with their solutions to these problems. Among them, Huang Jiongxiang et al., (2010) thought the
Chinese authorities should introduce a risk assessment system, upgrade the management of
insurance security fund, and establish policyholder’s protection mechanism. Chen Hua & Zhang Yan
(2010) also suggested more disclosure from insurance companies and close monitoring of risks.
Meanwhile, not a few studies have been done on the insurance market exit mechanism in Japan.
For example, Shen Nanning (2008) had studied the Japanese legislation and safeguard agencies
concerning insurance market exit mechanism, and also mentioned several prominent bankruptcy
cases. In 2010, the China Insurance News (中国保険報) ran a series of articles written by a
Japanese legal expert Inada Kosuke, a former employee of Japan’s Financial Service Agency, about
the legislation and practices of market exit mechanism in the Japanese insurance industry15. As a
matter of fact, due to geographical proximity and the same legal system of civil law, almost all
comparative studies in the international context have mentioned Japan as a mature and sophisticated
insurance market with rich experiences in market exit. These studies describe the Japanese
mechanism from many perspectives and provide a very good starting point for the present research.
SECTION 2.4 SUMMARY
The concept of market exit in the present thesis refers to the bankruptcy of an insurance
company. It does not include the voluntary disintegration or compulsory de-licensing of an insurance
company. Neither an exit of certain branch of a legal entity, nor an exit by a legal entity from certain
geographical area or from selling certain products counts as market exit in this research.
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The concept of market exit mechanism refers to the aggregation of laws and administrative
regulations and practices concerning market exit. In the context of the Chinese insurance market, the
mechanism includes the principles and procedures stipulated in the Insurance Law, the Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law and a series of administrative regulations made by the central government and the
CIRC. The present market exit mechanism in the Chinese insurance market has only abstract
principles in laws and discrete rules in several regulations. To improve the mechanism, the
authorities should substantiate such laws & regulations, to make the standards and procedures
transparent, workable and effective to deal with insurance market exit.
On the necessity of comprehensive legislation concerning insurance market exit mechanism,
relevant authorities home and abroad have made various discussions. The Chinese government has
already acknowledged the inalienable nature of such legislation for the market economy reform.
Based on the consensus about the necessity of legislation, scholars have done numerous researches
from many different perspectives. Some of these researches also delve into the Japanese insurance
market exit mechanism in an attempt to learn the experiences of advanced countries.
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CHAPTER 3. JAPANESE INSURANCE REGULATION &
MARKET EXIT MECHANISM
This chapter introduces the insurance regulation and market exit mechanism in Japan through
historical review and concrete case study. In Section 3.1, a discussion on the Japanese insurance
market and the development after WWII is made. The discussion is followed by an introduction to
the Japanese regulatory regime of the insurance industry. Particular attention is paid to the insurance
industry crisis starting from the late 1990s. In Section 3.2, an analysis of these bankrupt cases shows
that the Japanese insurance market exit mechanism consists of two independent procedures, i.e., the
administrative procedure and the judicial procedure. In Section 3.3 the bankruptcy cases of two
insurance companies are introduced to illustrate the application of these two procedures. Based on
these examples, a comparison between the administrative procedure and the judicial procedure is
made in Section 3.4. All in all, Chapter 3 provides the basis for the comparative study between the
insurance market exit mechanism in Japan and that in China.
SECTION 3.1 INSURANCE INDUSTRY &REGULATION
Modern insurance industry in Japan has treaded a long and winding road of development &
decline over more than a hundred years. Up to 2012, Japan had been the second largest insurance
market in the world for decades, with insurance premiums up to 654 billion US Dollars, ranking the
fourth in terms of insurance density (premium per capita) and the sixth in terms of insurance
penetration (premiums as % of GDP)16. Nevertheless, around the turning point into the 21st century,
several companies were confronted with failures and, under the guidance of the supervisory
authorities or through judicial process, exited from the market. In this way, a market exit mechanism
has gradually been developed.
Against the background of rapid recovery and sustained economic development after World
War II, especially in the booming years of 1980s, the Japanese insurance industry witnessed
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unprecedented prosperity and was universally acknowledged as a safe haven even after the bubble
economy burst in the mid-1990s. Insurance industry back then was characterized by a strong
administrative intervention, strict regulation of insurance rates and immunity from outside
competition. The regulation regime obviously could not keep up with the times and the bust of the
bubble economy also made the regime unsustainable. With the implementation of the new Insurance
Business Law (保険業法) in 1996, a fundamental reform in the insurance industry began. Cartel
rates, market entry rule and product regulation were abolished. The government moved away from a
convoy system（船団行政）to a new system characterized by free market rules. Insurance regulation
based on solvency margin has been established gradually, rendering bankruptcy of insurance
companies possible. The deepening of the financial crisis after the bubble, especially in the latter half
of 1990s, made the Japanese government determined to change its financial regulatory system. In
June 1998, the Financial Supervisory Agency (金融監督庁) was established and charged with all
supervisory power over banking, securities and insurance, i.e., the power previously held by the
Ministry of Finance (大蔵省). In 2002, the Financial Supervisory Agency was reorganized into the
Financial Services Agency（金融庁, FSA）.
Even before the establishment of the FSA, the first case of bankruptcy after World War II in the
insurance sector had already happened. Nissan Life Mutual Insurance Company (日産生命保険相
互会社)was the first in a row to go bankrupt, followed by eight other companies in 6 years. Among
these bankrupt companies, seven were life insurance companies and two were property & liability
insurance companies. Scholars have listed different reasons for the collective bankruptcy in a short
period. Generally speaking, three most important contributing factors exist, including the adverse
financial environment, the change of regulation regime and the loss of confidence from the public17.
To be specific, crossing holding of shares between banks and insurers made the latter vulnerable in a
time of banking crisis. Securities market’s bust had devalued insurers’ assets in the form of bonds. In
addition, with the introduction of near zero interest rate policy, the promised returns of many
insurance products seemed absurdly optimistic. In 1992, Japan’s life insurance companies were
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selling lifelong annuities with promised return of 5.5 percent. As interest rates and rates of return fell,
a gap opened between what the insurers had promised to pay and what they could expect to earn18.
As a matter of fact, the “negative carry” (逆ザヤ) existed in most insurance companies, and to a
large extent accounted for the deterioration of their financial situation and final bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, the government refrained from forging secret deal to cover another scandal in the
financial sector. Market exit according to the Insurance Business Law (保険業法) found its way
into these bankruptcy cases and finally market exit based on the Corporate Reorganization Law（会
社更生法）and the Reorganization Special Law（金融機関等の更生手続の特例等に関する法律）
through judicial procedures has become the first choice in insurers’ bankruptcy cases.
SECTION 3.2 INSURANCE MARKET EXIT MECHANISM
The market exit mechanism in the Japanese insurance market consists of two alternative
procedures, namely, the administrative procedure under the guidance of the FSA based on the
Insurance Business Law and relevant administrative regulations, and the judicial procedure
according to the Corporate Reorganization Law and the Reorganization Special Law.
On the one hand, in the five cases from Nissan Life to Taisyo Life (大正生命), the
administrative procedure was adopted to wind up these failing businesses. With a strong government
regulation as the tradition, the supervisory watchdog (FSA) intervened when bankruptcy became a
reality in the late 1990s. The FSA is empowered by the Insurance Business Law to handle insurers
on the verge of bankruptcy. The criteria for the FSA to intervene are stated in Article 241 of the
Insurance Business Law: If the Prime Minister finds that the continuation of insurance business will
be difficult in light of the status of the business or property of an insurance company, or the
management of that business is extremely inappropriate and that there is a risk that the continuation
of insurance business could bring about a situation harmful to the protection for policyholders, the
Prime Minister may order the whole or partial suspension of business, a merger, a transfer of
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insurance contracts or an agreement for the acquisition of the shares of that insurance company by
another insurance company.
To initiate the bankruptcy process, the FSA appoints an insurance administrator (保険管理人)
to look after the financial assets & exiting business, and orders the problem company to enter talks
of merger or acquisition with a possible receiving company. Moreover, the FSA could also ask
policyholders protection agency (保険契約者保護機構) to provide funds to the receiving company
or to receive the existing business of the problem company by the agency itself in case that no
receiving company appears. The procedure is illustrated in Appendix 1.
On the other hand, all cases starting from Chiyoda Life adopted the judicial procedure to realize
reorganization and withdrawal of failed businesses. The role of the FSA is significantly reduced in
the judicial procedure. Generally speaking, the problem insurance company, after recognizing its
financial troubles, applied to the court for the initiation of the reorganization process. The court
should ask for advice from the FSA before its judgment. The court then appoints a reorganization
trustee (更生管財人) to manage the failing company’s assets and businesses. The reorganization
trustee should then submit a reorganization proposal to the court for approval. As the last step, the
court will decide when the reorganization process should officially end. According to relevant laws,
the FSA also has the power to submit reorganization application as to a problem company, though
there is no such a case up to now. More details of the above procedure are illustrated in Appendix 2.
To sum up, the market exit mechanism in Japan includes two independent procedures based on
different laws. With the cooperation of policyholders protection agencies, these procedures have
ensured orderly exit of insurance companies from the market without posing systemic risk to the
whole financial system. In addition, ever since the revision of the Reorganization Special Law in
2000, which allows mutual insurance companies to apply for reorganization, all failed insurance
companies were handled in accordance with the judicial procedure.
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SECTION 3.3 TWO CASES: NISSAN LIFE & CHIYODA LIFE
Altogether ten insurance companies went bankrupt from 1997 to 2008. Half of them adopted
the administrative procedure to withdraw from the market, and the other half adopted the judicial
procedure. Among them, Nissan Life and Chiyoda Life were cases in which these procedures were
adopted for the first time. The analysis of the two cases could explain the two procedures further.
Nissan Life was stressed with negative carry as many other companies were. To make things
worse, the company invested heavily into the stock market and foreign securities, ending up with a
crush in value after the bubble economy burst. Due to the legacy of closed-door management and
convoy system of the government, bad financial information was kept in the closet until the
company could no longer persist any more. On April 25th1997, the Ministry of Finance, the then
supervisory body, ordered Nissan Life to stop its insurance business and asked the Association of
Insurance Companies of Japan to act as the insurance administrator in charge of Nissan Life’s
business & assets. Since no company was willing to salvage Nissan Life and the government refused
to use the administrative power to force a deal, the Association of Insurance Companies of Japan
created a new company called Aoba Life (青葉生命) with the financial assistance from the
policyholders protection fund. Although the government vowed to give full protection to
policyholders, the debts had grown to be too big to be filled, promised interests to policyholders had
been compromised and premature termination by the policyholders would be punished heavily.
The bankruptcy of Nissan Life was the first bankruptcy case in the Japanese insurance
industry after WWII. It exposed many shortcomings of the insurance market exit mechanism. The
legal requirement of disclosure of financial information was minimum, giving the management team
too much time to waste or take desperate measures, which helped exacerbate the situation. The
Japanese government was not responsive to the difficulty in Nissan Life when they were well
acquainted with the insolvency problem of Nissan Life19, and was slow in adopting market exit
procedure to the detriment of policyholders’ interests. Moreover, the policyholder protection fund
was seriously flawed in its operation mechanism, fund collection and decision-making process. As a
matter of fact, one of the main reasons why the regulator in Japan was slow to take action in the
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Nissan Life’ case was the lack of a reliable safety net to protect policyholders’ interests beforehand.
The crisis also prompted the Japanese government to adopt a series of new regulations in
response. After the Nissan case, policyholders protection agencies were established and its
responsibilities were expanded gradually with the unfolding of the crisis. Furthermore, the
fundraising model was also modified to handle the chain bankruptcy after Nissan Life. After the
approval of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, the policyholders protection agency
could borrow up to 460 billion Yen from financial institutions in order to provide protection to
policyholders. If the borrowing money is still inadequate to deal with the crisis, the government
also had promised to provide financial assistance after the approval of the Diet20. In another move to
prevent systemic failure of the industry, the Insurance Business Law was also revised to allow an
insurance company to renegotiate terms of contracts with policyholders after the company becomes
aware of the pending bankruptcy. After performing necessary procedures, the company might reduce
its obligations to policyholders and avoid the fate of bankruptcy. On appearance, the interests of
policyholders are compromised, but the significance of avoiding the bankruptcy of a company to the
stability of the financial market and the interests of the whole society is also important. The change
of terms of contracts also confirms with the self-governance spirit of private contracts.
Three years later, Chiyoda Life faced the same fate of bankruptcy. Reasons for its bankruptcy
included negative carry and wrong investment decision into the property market20. Unlike its
predecessors, Chiyoda Life was the first company to adopt the judicial procedure to wind up its
business. On October 9th 2000, Chiyoda Life applied for reorganization to the court according to the
Reorganization Special Law, which was newly revised on the same year to accommodate mutual life
insurance companies. The court decided the reorganization trustee and approved the reorganization
plan with AIG as the sponsor company. In April 2001, Chiyoda Life was renamed as AIG Star Life
and reopened business. The form of the organization was also transformed from a mutual company
into a joint-stock company.
In the case of Chiyoda Life, the myth of solvency margin was exposed. Solvency margin was
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based on the American concept of RBC (Risk-based Capital) to understand the financial condition of
an insurance company, but serious flaws existed in the calculation methods of solvency margin. As a
matter of fact, in the year of Chiyoda Life’s bankruptcy, its solvency margin was high above the
standard of a healthy company set by the FSA21. The root of the problem lies in the design of
calculation methods of solvency margin. In order to make solvency margin a more reliable indicator
of the financial situation in an insurance company, solvency margin was redefined in 2000 in its
calculation methods22.
Table 3-1 shows the comparison between the bankruptcy cases of Nissan Life and Chiyoda
Life. This table provides a glimpse into the basic financial conditions of the two companies.
Although both were saddled with huge debts, only Nissan Life received monetary assistance from
the policyholders protection fund. The reason is that in the case of Chiyoda Life, the reorganization
trustee created a bidding model for prospective sponsor bidders, who promised not to ask for
assistance from the fund. What made the bidding attractive without the monetary assistance is that in
the reorganization plan debts to other parties other than policyholders could be exempted. Chiyoda
Life’s case shows the flexibility of the reorganization plan and the priority of policyholders rights in
insurance market exit. The line of “Gap” in Table 3-1 includes the amount of debts that were
exempted as well as the deduction on policy reserves. At the same time, the deduction on the return
rate and the heavy fine on premature termination of insurance polices were introduced in both cases.
In this process, the interests of policyholders had to be compromised. Nevertheless, in both
procedures, important moves concerning the change of policyholders rights were pending on the
consent of policyholders. For example, deduction of contract profits or the approval of
reorganization plan all set certain period of public disclosure and feedbacks for policyholders to
voice their discontent and overrule suggestions of these moves.
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Table 3-1. Comparison between bankruptcy cases of Nissan Life and Chiyoda Life (Billion Yen)
Items Nissan Life (日産生命) Chiyoda Life （千代田生
命）
Bankruptcy Date 1997-4-25 2000-10-20
Legal Basis Insurance Business Law Reorganization Special Law
Procedure Administrative Procedure Judicial Procedure
Responsible Public Entity Financial Services Agency The Court
Assets 1822 2258
Debts 2144 2855
Difference -322 -597
Goodwill Recorded 123 318
Monetary Assistance 199 0
Gap 0 279
Assistant Organization Policyholders Protection
fund
Policyholders Protection
Agency
Anticipated Return Rate before
Bankruptcy
3.75~5.5% 3.70%
Anticipated Return Rate after
Bankruptcy
2.75% 1.50%
Deduction on Premature Termination of
Policy
15~3% 7ys 20~2% 10ys
Insurance administrator Life Insurance Association N/A
Reorganization Trustee N/A Lawyers & AIG
Sponsor Life Insurance Association AIG (America)
Takeover Company Aoba Life N/A
New Company N/A AIG Star
SOURCE: 深尾光洋+日本経済研究センター、生保危機は終わらない、東洋経済新報社、２００４年４月.
SECTION 3.4 COMPARISION BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE & JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
Both administrative and judicial procedures were applied in handling bankruptcy cases and these
procedures are still applicable in the future. Viewed from different angels, both procedures have
merits and demerits. Table 3-2 is a simple comparison between the two different procedures of
market exit in Japan. In order to compare these two procedures, it is desirable to compare the role of
the FSA in different procedures as the starting point.
On the one hand, in the administrative procedure, the FSA as the regulatory authority holds the
ultimate power in dealing with failed insurance companies. To be more specific, the FSA decides the
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timing to intervene and the concrete administrative measures to suspend business of the problem
Table 3-2. Comparison of Different Procedures of Market Exit in Japan (Made by the Author)
Procedure Administrative Procedure Judicial Procedure
Legal Basis Insurance Business Law Reorganization Special Law
Person in charge
of the problem
company
Insurance administrator
appointed by the FSA
Reorganization trustee
appointed by the court
Responsible
public entity Financial Services Agency The court
Method Transfer of existing business
to a receiving company
Reorganization under the
support of a sponsor (sponsors)
Transparency,
credibility,
impartiality
Less More
Professional
Knowledge More Less
Relationship
with the problem
company
The supervisor and the
supervised
Not related
Example Nissan Life Chiyoda Life
company. The FSA could apply to the court to freeze all civil lawsuits against the said company and
the implementation of court decisions. The FSA also decides the insurance administrator who will be
charged with the management of the exiting business & assets and the research task of a sponsor
company. Finally, the FSA could also ask the policyholders protection agencies to provide the
receiving company with financial support. Obviously, the FSA plays the dominant role in the
administrative procedure.
On the other hand, the judicial procedure precludes the deep intervention by the administrative
agency. The problem company could choose to apply for reorganization to the court directly, and the
court would decide the reorganization trustee and approve the reorganization plan. The laws also
stipulate provisions for the involvement of the FSA in the judicial procedure. For example, the FSA
could apply directly to the court for the reorganization of the problem company. What’s more,
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throughout the judicial process, the court is required by law to solicit opinions from the FSA and ask
assistance in check & investigation. Still, the role of the FSA is significantly reduced in the judicial
procedure. The court becomes the dominant entity to handle the reorganization process.
According to the regulation capture theory, a regulatory agency established to regulate the
industry and promote public welfare is sometimes captured by the industry ultimately and serves the
interests of the industry instead. Therefore, people are generally vigilant to the administrative power
in economic life. From this point of view, the judicial procedure in Japan provides a window for the
problem company to seek the court to decide the case. Compared with the FSA, the court is not
deeply involved in the insurance business and has no interest in the outcome of the case. Therefore,
the verdict from the court is seen as more impartial and convincing to some extent. Nevertheless,
bankruptcy cases in the insurance industry are rare. The court’s understanding of the problem
company is rather limited. Conversely, the FSA monitors the problem company all the time and is
very familiar with the financial conditions and development of the said company. Furthermore, the
FSA usually intervenes in case of business difficulty of the problem company long before the
company goes bankrupt. Therefore, even in the judicial procedure, the FSA still has an important
role to play.
Companies after the Chiyoda cases all went through the judicial procedure to exit from the
insurance market, when they could also wait for the order of the FSA to handle their cases through
the administrative procedure. Three reasons account for the transition from the administrative
procedure to the judicial procedure. Firstly, the Reorganization Special Law was originally designed
to exclude a mutual life insurance company from applying the law. After the revision of the law in
2000, a mutual company had the option to go through the judicial procedure. Secondly, public trust
in the judicial sector made the verdict of the court more convincing and less disputable. As a matter
of fact, due to a series of failures and scandals from the Ministry of Finance in the financial crisis
back in 1990s, there was a serious lack of confidence from the public regarding the administration’s
ability, transparency and justice in dealing with bankruptcy cases. Thirdly, the Insurance Business
Law and the Reorganization Special Law has included relevant articles to ensure the cooperation
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between the court and the FSA. Sufficient communication between the judicial and administrative
authorities makes the alignment of the two parties’ merits mentioned above possible. As a result, the
judicial procedure becomes the preferred procedure by all parties in handling bankruptcy cases after
the Chiyoda case.
SECTION 3.5 SUMMARY
In the Japanese model of insurance market exit mechanism, a series of laws and relevant
administrative regulations provide clear guidelines on market exit. Market exit criteria including
solvency margin are clarified. Administrative & judicial procedures were administered according to
respective laws. A safety net with protection fund as the basis has also been established. From the
point view of public risk management, the Japanese model had avoided systemic failure in the
financial system and defused public panic to some extent. As a matter of fact, no company on the top
list in terms of systemic importance was pushed to the brink of failure in spite of adverse
environment. The Japanese authorities responded promptly to establish policyholders protection
agencies and modify the Reorganization Special Law. The effective management of the crisis and
adjustment of market exit mechanism cannot be overrated.
Meanwhile, the evolvement of market exit mechanism was nothing but painstaking, full of turns
& twists. In many aspects, the Japanese supervisory authorities were unprepared for the crisis. The
double-procedure model is by no means a result of deliberate design but of natural evolvement as the
financial crisis was unfolding. Although the first cases of bankruptcy through the administrative
procedure were completed successfully, the judicial procedure was recognized as the more proper
procedure through which reorganization of an insurance company could be made. The court has the
obvious advantage of impartiality, transparency and confidence from the public. A smooth transition
from the risk management of the regulator to the reorganization proceedings by the court, coupled
with adequate support from the regulator ensures the effectiveness of the judicial procedure.
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CHAPTER 4. CHINESE INSURANCE REGULATION & MARKET
EXIT MECHANISM
This Chapter explains the Chinese insurance industry and regulation in general, and pays
particular attention to the insurance market exit mechanism. In Section 4.1, a review of the
development of the Chinese insurance industry is made. Insurance supervision under the CIRC has
made remarkable progress, but the regulatory regime is still in urgent need of transformation from a
hands-on style to a liberal style with more respect to the law of market. Section 4.2 discusses the
existing insurance market exit mechanism in China. A preliminary framework of market exit
mechanism has already been built. However, the mechanism is incomplete and in many aspects
flawed. The problems of the existing market exit mechanism are described in Section 4.3 in detail.
The whole chapter presents the Chinese insurance market exit mechanism in contrast with the
mechanism in Japan. Problems listed in the end of the chapter call for further improvement of the
mechanism, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
SECTION 4.1 INSURANCE INDUSTRY & REGULATION
Modern insurance industry in China started in the 19th century and prospered in big industrial
centers such as Shanghai in the first half of the 20th century. After 1949, the year when the People’s
Republic of China was founded, only one state-owned insurance company was allowed to operate in
China. In 1958, even the single company was ordered to stop its domestic business under political
influences. It was not until 1979 that the insurance industry was once again restored. Since then,
insurance has become one of the most rapid development sectors in the national economy. In 2012,
the Chinese insurance industry collected US$ 221.858 billion premiums, ranking the 4th in market
size worldwide. However, in terms of insurance penetration and density, China only ranks the 46th
and 61st, showing that China still has a long way to go in building a strong insurance sector24.
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With the rapid expansion of insurance business, industry risks have also accumulated rapidly. In
1998, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) was established as the main watchdog
over the insurance industry and charged with the responsibility to protect policyholders’ interests and
maintain the stability of the market. The CIRC takes “prevent and reduce risks” as one of its main
regulatory objectives. Since its establishment, the CIRC has established a three-pillar regulatory
framework, including the supervision of solvency margin, corporate governance and market
behaviors, all of which are closely related to risk management. In the year 1995, the first Insurance
Law was promulgated and undergone revision in 2002 and again in 2009. Based on the Insurance
Law, the CIRC has also made great efforts in legislation, which has largely standardized the business
and improved the transparency of supervision. Along with the supervisory agencies in securities and
banking as well as the central bank, the financial regulatory community in China is referred as “One
Bank & Three Commissions (一行三会)” system. The system is different from the Japanese system
in that the FSA in Japan holds all powers that are distributed into three independent commissions in
China’s case.
Although numerous steps have been taken in the direction of market economy reform, up to
now, the Chinese insurance regulatory regime still takes a hands-on approach, which is similar to
what Japanese supervisors did before the 1990s. For example, policy rates and products are still
heavily regulated. Operations from the establishment of a branch company to the appointment of a
managerial position or even the relocation of a small sales shop are still subject to prior
administrative permission. The deep involvement in business operations from the government is
partly due to a strong tradition of a planned economy, and partly due to the fact that the CIRC used
to see itself as not only the supervisor but also the manager of the industry. The outdated regulatory
regime must be updated in China’s drive to build a limited government instead of an almighty one.
Besides, financial liberalization has become one of the main reform targets in the next decade or so.
Against this background, the CIRC will stop acting as a babysitter for all companies but become a
referee to ensure rule & order.
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Since the establishment of the CIRC, altogether three insurance companies were in perilous
status as a result of mismanagement, violation of laws, poor corporate governance or inadequate
internal control25. In the case of Xinhua Life Insurance in 2007, the chairman of the company was
deposed and thrown into jail after his abuse of insurance fund was found. The CIRC declared that
the Insurance Security Fund bought all shares from the chairman and became the biggest shareholder.
The CIRC also urged the company to improve corporate governance and solvency adequacy. After
the recovery of the company, the Insurance Security Fund Co. Ltd sold out all shares it held. In 2009,
a large property & liability company called China United Property Insurance was saddled with
serious problems including solvency inadequacy, poor corporate governance and low quality
businesses. The CIRC sent a team of internal control to take over the company. The team worked to
improve the profitability, compliance and management. The Insurance Security Fund Co. Ltd once
again stepped in to provide monetary assistance to the company. In a third case, a health insurance
company could barely survive in harsh market condition and committed serious illegal activities.
Another insurer bought the company after the CIRC approved the restructuring plan.
Examples above exhibit CIRC’s basic methods in handling critical insurance companies. These
methods include risk monitoring, suspension of company expansion, restructuring and takeover of
the company in the worst scenario. All these measures are authorized in the Insurance Law to
manage problem companies. However, market exit has not become an option in all cases. These
cases illustrate the mindset of the supervisor to protect insurance companies from bankruptcy as well
as the immaturity nature of the market exit mechanism in China.
SECTION 4.2 INSURANCE MARKET EXIT MECHANISM
The question of market exit did not catch enough attention of the regulatory authorities until the
beginning of the 21st century. With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization and the easing
of market entry, numerous insurance companies with different backgrounds have come onto the
stage and the risk of failure has become more and more obvious. As a response to the risk of
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financial market exit, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was revised in 2006 to include the
reorganization and bankruptcy liquidation of financial institutions for the first time. The Insurance
Law was also revised in 2009 to include guidelines on insurance market exit. Based on the two laws,
the CIRC has promulgated a series of regulations related to market exit. These regulations include
but not limited to the Insurance Company Regulation Ordnance, the Insurance Company Solvency
Regulation Ordnance, and the Insurance Security Fund Regulation Ordnance, etc., covering
numerous aspects including internal control, solvency, capital utilization, share transfer, and safety
fund. All of these regulations, together with the Insurance Law and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,
constitute the legal framework of China’s insurance market exit mechanism.
First, the criteria of bankruptcy are made in these two laws. According to Article 2 of the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, when an enterprise becomes insolvent and its assets are insufficient to
discharge all of its debts or it clearly lacks the capacity to discharge such debts, its debts shall be
liquidated or it should be reorganized. This is the standard of bankruptcy for all enterprises including
insurance companies. Article 90 of the Insurance Law reiterates the standard above.
Secondly, the subject to apply for reorganization or bankruptcy liquidation is also stipulated.
According to Article 90 of the Insurance Law, the insurance company or its creditors may, with the
consent of the CIRC, apply to the court in accordance with the law for reorganization, reconciliation
or bankruptcy liquidation. The CIRC may also apply for the reorganization or bankruptcy liquidation
of the said insurance company. In Article 134, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law empowers the CIRC
to submit a petition to the court to reorganize an insurance company or have it declared bankrupt.
Thirdly, the concrete procedure of reorganization or bankruptcy liquidation of a financial
institution has not been promulgated, but the legislative power has already been authorized to the
central government. Article 134 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law reads that in case that a financial
institution goes into bankruptcy, the State Council may formulate implementation measures in
accordance with this law and other relevant laws. So far, no such implementation measures have
been promulgated yet.
Fourthly, a safety net in the form of the insurance security fund has been sanctified. According
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to Article 100 of the Insurance Law, all insurance companies are required to make contributions to
this fund. The fund should be mobilized to provide relief to policyholders in case of bankruptcy or to
an insurance company that receives transferred businesses from the bankrupt company. The
mobilization principles and procedures of the insurance security fund are also established by relevant
regulations and implemented by the China Insurance Security Fund, Co. Ltd.
All in all, China has already established a preliminary legal framework for insurance market
exit with the Insurance Law and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law as the basis. In this legal framework,
the division of the administrative agency and the judicial branch is made. Administrative measures in
handling a problem insurance company stops when the judicial procedure begins. The judicial
procedure is recognized as the sole procedure through which bankruptcy liquidation or
reorganization of an insurance company is handled. The CIRC dominates the pre-judicial
proceedings in taking crisis disposal measures. These measures include administrative penalty and
order of correction, or in a worse situation the CIRC could send a team of rectification to a problem
company. In the worst situation the CIRC might also take over the company directly as the last resort
before a case of bankruptcy is filed to the court. Although administrative measures are not legally
required prior to a bankruptcy case of an insurance company, in most cases the CIRC would take all
necessary measures to prevent the company from bankruptcy until the said company becomes
beyond redemption at all.
SECTION 4.3 PROBLEMS
Insurance market exit in China has legal basis in the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the
Insurance Law and relevant administrative regulations. However, these are not laws specially
regulating insurance market exit, and carry only abstract principles without concrete & practical
implementation items. The legal framework for insurance market exit is not only incomplete, but is
also seriously flawed in many aspects. The existing mechanism is not ready for a bankruptcy case in
the insurance market.
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Firstly, the legal framework is not complete, calling for further legislation. Article 134 of the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law authorizes the State Council to stipulate implementation measures
according to this law and other relevant laws. So far, no such measures have been promulgated yet.
As a result, bankruptcy of an insurance company through the judicial procedure has no concrete
guidance to follow. Meanwhile, the Insurance Law also empowers the regulator to dispose of a
problem insurance company, but again no concrete regulation specifying workable criteria and
concrete procedures exists. In other words, the general principles stipulated in the Insurance Law
leave most details to the discretion of the regulator. The situation not only increases the possibility of
abuse of power by the regulator, but also provides good excuses for negligence of duty on the
regulator’s side.
Secondly, the criteria for the initiation of the bankruptcy process as of an insurance
company are not practical. Although Solvency and liquidity are reliable index for the financial status
of an ordinary enterprise, in the case of an insurance company, debts are larger than assets most of
the time. Moreover, for an insurance company, liquidity can be improved easily by adopting lower
policy rates and higher promised returns, which would only postpone a crisis and drag down a
problem company further. Therefore, the existing criteria cannot tell the regulator the real financial
status of an insurance company. The case of Chiyoda Life in Japan tells that even solvency margin is
not as reliable as it sounds. On June 5th 2014, the CIRC ordered insurance companies to stop
calculating the value of real estates in fair value and indicated a revision on solvency margin
calculation26. The order shows that more comprehensive criteria system should be adopted to
provide reliable assessment of an insurance company’s condition.
Thirdly, the procedure of bankruptcy has not been ironed out. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law
as well as the Insurance Law has made it clear that the regulator has the ultimate power to decide the
proceedings in crisis disposal before bankruptcy and whether to enter the bankruptcy process or not.
These two laws also ascertain that the court should hear the bankruptcy case. However, in both
pre-judicial procedure and the judicial procedure, problems such as the selection of a receiving
company, the appointment of bankruptcy administrator, and the role of the regulator in the judicial
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procedure are unclear. Moreover, the existing law empowers the CIRC with overwhelming decision-
making powers such as application for reorganization or bankruptcy and the designation of a
receiving company, without remedies by relevant parties. Although existing laws allows for the
application of reorganization or bankruptcy by other parties, prior approval by the CIRC is necessary.
For insurance companies, judicial remedy might be needed to counteract to the regulator’s decision.
Meanwhile, the Insurance Law empowers the CIRC to designate a particular insurance company as
the receiving company to receive transferred businesses from a bankrupt company. In Japan, the FSA
has only the ability to mediate in the negotiation between the failed company and the prospective
receiving company but cannot ensure the success of the negotiation. In the case of designation of a
receiving company by the CIRC directly, the protection of legitimate rights of relevant parties could
also be in question. Due to the lack of transparency in these decision-making processes, a sense of
unfairness might rise when the regulator is free to make judgment without specific criteria to refer
to.
Fourthly, a sound safety net has not been fully built. Although the insurance security fund has
already been built, in case of a catastrophic disaster or chain bankruptcy, if the fund is not capable of
providing enough assistance, the source of additional finance is not sorted out. By the end of the
February 2014, the total volume of the fund had reached 49 Billion Yuan (roughly 8 billion US
Dollar), indicating a significant growth from 14.9 billion Yuan when the corporation was founded 5
years ago27. However, compared with the size of the industry and large insurance companies, this
volume is far from enough. For example, the largest life insurer China Life collected a total of 324.8
billion Yuan of new premiums in the single year of 2013, which is more than 5 times larger than
fund28. Furthermore, the safety net does not include the protection mechanism to ensure the
maximization of interests of all stakeholders and the society. A well-designed safety net should
protect not only policyholders, but also protect against systemic collapse of the market and the
disorder of the society. Therefore, the existing safety net is neither not effective to provide protection
in the insurance market exit.
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SECTION 4.4 SUMMARY
The history of China’s insurance industry and regulation shows that market exit mechanism
comes with the development of the industry and the transformation of regulatory regime. When the
insurance market becomes increasingly mature, market exit becomes inevitable and sometimes even
desirable. The Chinese authorities have anticipated the insurance market exit problem and made
great efforts in the direction to establish a sound market exit mechanism.
Right now, insurance market exit mechanism in China has already had a preliminary
framework. The Insurance Law and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, along with numerous
administrative regulations, provide the legal basis of insurance market exit. However, the abstract
nature of the framework and the lack of concrete & effective standards make the framework difficult
to apply in concrete cases. China has not finished the legislative plan. The criteria of bankruptcy
are unclear and flawed. Proper procedures haven’t been established clearly. The safety net is also not
sound enough to provide enough safeguards in case of certain insurance business failures. In
addition, there is no bankruptcy case of insurance companies so far, risk disposal of failing
companies has largely been done case by case. The existing insurance market exit could not cope
with the complex situation after further market reform and financial liberalization.
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CHAPTER 5. CONLUSIONS
The objective of the thesis was to present legislative suggestions on the improvement of
insurance market exit mechanism to the Chinese insurance regulator and relevant legislators. The
analyses so far illustrate that China should borrow the experiences of Japan to establish a fair, open
& just insurance market exit mechanism, to protect policyholders’ rights and maintain market &
social stability. A fair mechanism means that the mechanism should apply to all insurance companies
without prejudices whatsoever. The fairness calls for clear definition of criteria. An open
mechanism means that the mechanism includes adequate disclosure of information concerning the
decision-making process by relevant authorities. The openness calls for the setup of transparent
procedures. And a just mechanism means that legitimate rights of all stakeholders, especially those
of policyholders should be protected. The justice calls for the protection with a well-designed safety
net. To establish a fair, open & just insurance market exit mechanism, the following suggestions
should be considered. These suggestions fall into four aspects, including the form of the market exit
legislation, the criteria of market exit, the procedure of market exit and the safety net in market exit.
SECTION 5.1 CONSOLIDATE LEGAL FREMEWORK
The State Council (cabinet) should promulgate two related regulations based on the existing
Insurance Law and Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, with respective focus on the administrative
procedure by which the regulator disposes of a problem company before the file of bankruptcy to the
court and the judicial procedure by which the court hears the bankruptcy case.
As explained in Section 4 of Chapter 3, administrative & judicial procedures in Japan all have
detailed legislation in the Insurance Business Law and the Reorganization Special Law. When the
judicial procedure is adopted, coordination principles between the regulator and the court are also
included in both laws. In China, the integration of the administrative procedure of risk disposal and
the judicial procedure of bankruptcy proceedings will be essential to a sound market exit mechanism.
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Through these two regulations, a bankruptcy procedure with the court at the center and the active
support of the regulator will be established. Moreover, in order to implement the two regulations,
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) should enact auxiliary rules on more detailed
subjects afterwards. In addition, the insurance market exit mechanism should be updated
continuously to reflect the latest development of the industry and its supervision at home and abroad.
SECTION 5.2 CLARIFY MARKET EXIT CRETERIA
Criteria of insurance market exit should be a composite index based on solvency margin, and
also include crucial factors of internal control, management capability and quality of business
&assets, etc., to provide a reliable reference framework for the regulator and the court.
As mentioned in Section 2 & Section 4 of Chapter 3, the Japanese insurance market exit criteria
is flexible in that the criteria include not limited to financial difficulty but also include inappropriate
management and the possibility of harming policyholders’ interests. As the most reliable quantitative
indicator, solvency margin should be taken as the primary standard by which decisions on regulatory
measures and bankruptcy application are made. Besides solvency margin, more factors should be
considered in building a more reliable index system to fully understand the condition of an insurance
company and make sound judgment on the sustainability of the company. Crisis of solvency margin
does not necessarily mean a company has gone down beyond redemption, but along with solvency
problem, if the company also suffers from poor corporate governance, inadequate internal control, or
low quality businesses, the difficulty to rescue the company will increase significantly. All these
factors should be taken into consideration to decide whether it is time to resort to the bankruptcy
process. In addition, the index system including solvency margin should be carefully designed and
also subject to adjustment to reflect the financial risk of an insurance company accurately.
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SECTION 5.3 ESTABLISH TRANSPARENT PROCEDURE
Market exit procedure adopted by relevant authorities should have legal basis outlined clearly
in relevant laws & regulations and allows maximum disclosure of information on decision-making
process and remedies against encroachment upon the legitimate rights of stakeholders.
As stated in Section 1 of Chapter 3, Japan suffered a lot from opaque administration before,
and after financial liberalization and extensive legislation, remarkable progress has been made in
information disclosure on decision-making process and the restraint from excessive administrative
intervention. The scope & boundary of power must be clearly defined to realize market exit in a
market economy. The role of the regulator should be confined to consultation & cooperation once
the bankruptcy proceedings initiate, and the court should be empowered with the ultimate deciding
power throughout the bankruptcy proceedings. Responsibility for information disclosure comes with
power. The regulator should be accountable for decisions such as allowing or refusing an insurance
company to apply for reorganization or bankruptcy liquidation, or the decision on the designation of
a receiving company. The court should be accountable for the appointment of bankruptcy
administrator or the approval of reorganization plan. Moreover, legislation on market exit procedure
should make sure voices of all stakeholders could be heard and provide channels of remedy to
protect their legitimate rights, especially against the encroachment of the authorities.
SECTION 5.4 IMPROVE SAFETY NET
The safety net should be improved in two aspects, namely, the optimization of the fundraising
model of the insurance security fund to handle crisis of great magnitude, and the maximization of
social interests as well as policyholders’ rights to realize market & social stability.
As explained in Section 2 of Chapter 3, Japan once faced chain bankruptcy failures and the
protection fund was soon out of cash, and reinforcement of the fund was introduced in the form of
borrowing from financial institutions and government assistance. A reliable safety net is the basis for
a market-wise exit mechanism. In order to solve the inadequacy problem of the fund in case of chain
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bankruptcy or bankruptcy of especially large companies, a multi-layer fundraising model should be
built in light of Japanese experiences. Meanwhile, the rights of policyholders and societal interests in
general should be balanced. One of the main objectives of financial supervision is to ensure the
stability of the market and the society. Since a company is not only a productive unit but also an
important member of the society, in terms of employment, further education and social welfare, the
rule of contract renegotiation in Japan as a method to avoid bankruptcy liquidation and maintain
social stability should be considered in Chinese legislation.
Suggestions above follow the full understanding of insurance industry & regulation in Japan
and China, explained in detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Based on the rich experiences of market
exit in the Japanese insurance market, these suggestions are formulated to address the most
important problems in the existing market exit mechanism in China. The four suggestions should be
considered by relevant authorities in order to improve the mechanism. However, the adoption of
each suggestion must be done under different situation and with different tempo and effort. Firstly,
the consolidation of the legal framework could be realized in two steps. The administrative
procedure of risk disposal should be promulgated first, since the regulator needs the regulation more
frequently in its daily work. The judicial procedure of bankruptcy of insurance companies is
supposed to be put in one regulation along with that of securities and banking institutions. One
obvious obstacle is that China doesn’t have deposit insurance mechanism, so that bankruptcy of
banks could not be allowed. Therefore, the legislation on the judicial procedure must wait for the
banking sector to have a safety net first. Secondly, to clarify market exit criteria, a scientific design
of solvency margin is the first step. Right now, China Insurance Regulatory Commission is
undertaking the task of designing a second-generation solvency margin framework. Once finished,
the framework will serve as the main indicator. The next step will be the design of a more
comprehensive index system with solvency margin as its basis. Thirdly, the establishment of
transparent procedure is consistent with China’s drive to build a transparent and limited government.
Moreover, transparency is also helpful to alleviate the pressure of the authorities and improve public
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confidence in the insurance market exit mechanism. Therefore, all sides could readily accept the
transparency rule. Last but not the least, the improvement of the safety net behind market exit could
also take two steps. First, fundraising model could be reinforced lately as discussion is going on in
China to revise the regulation of the insurance security fund. Nevertheless, the renegotiation of an
existing insurance contract is a new concept to Chinese insurance industry, so that more time might
be taken to adopt this policy.
In the final analysis, comprehensive legislation of insurance market exit mechanism will be a
landmark event in China’s drive for market economy and financial liberalization. The legislation
should keep pace with the development of China’s economy and the reality of Chinese insurance
industry. As the public in China still has high expectations for the government to guaranty every
financial institution, gradual easing of government control and step-by-step introduction of
market-oriented market exit mechanism call for mastership of patience as well as courage. Finally,
although the legislation is on market exit, close monitoring, early warning & timely corrective
measures to improve financial situation of a problem company should remain the priority for the
regulator. It is only after all these measures have failed that the process of market exit could begin.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1. Market exit through administrative procedure
Source: Japan Financial Services Agency website: http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/hoken_hogo/04.pdf
i
,保険業法手続きによる保険会社の破綻処理の基本的な流れ。
Appendix 2. Market exit through judicial procedure
Source: Japan Financial Services Agency website: http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/hoken_hogo/04.pdf
ii
,保険会社の更生手続きの基本的な流れ。
